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O'CONNOR v. CONSOLIDATED COIN CATERERS
CORP.: CAN AN ADEA PLAINTIFF EVER WIN?
I. INTRODUCTION
Other acquainted years sidle with modest decorum across the scrim of
toughened tears and to a stage planked with laughter boards and waxed
with rueful loss but forty with the authorized brazenness of a uniformed
cop stomps no-knocking into the script bumps a funky grind on the shab-
by curtain of youth and delays the action. Unless you have the inborn
wisdom and grace and are clever enough to die at thirty-nine.'
Age discrimination in employment is ever-increasing as aging is inevitable
and as society places its emphasis on youthfulness. In today's society, workers
are becoming older and their need to continue working is often a necessity in
order to survive. Today, because of increased longevity, approximately thirty-
million people in the United States are age sixty-five or older, which represents
one out of eight citizens of the United States.2 By the year 2010, approximately
one-half of the workers in the United States will be age forty or over The
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), the federal agency
charged with enforcing and administering the Age Discrimination Employment
Act ("ADEXA"), reported that age discrimination complaints were the fastest
growing category of claims that it dealt with.4
In O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp.,5 the Supreme Court
held in an unanimous decision, that an employer, who replaces an older worker
because of age, with another younger worker in the same protected class, may
violate the ADEA.6 Though the holding seems simple, the brief rule of the case
raises several unanswered questions. For example, do courts look at a replace-
ment worker being younger or being substantially younger than the terminated
employee or prospective applicant? Is proof of a replacement necessary in de-
termining if a plaintiff has a prima facie case? The Supreme Court still did not
1. Maya Angelou, On Reaching Forty, in MAYA ANGELoU: POEMS, 58 (Bantam Books 1986).
2. See SENATE SPECIAL COMMIrIEE ON AGING, 101ST CONG., IST SESS., AGING AMERICA-TRENDS
AND PROJECTIONS 1 (Comm. Print 1989).
3. See The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., Older Americans in the Workforce: Challenges and Solu-
tions, 1, 6 (1987).
4. See Vihstadt, Congressional Update, 5 BIFOCAL 8 (1984). The EEOC's office of Program Opera-
tions reported in its 1985 Annual Report that the number of ADEA charges filed with the agency rose from
8,101 in 1981 to 11,328 in 1984, which was a 40% increase during the four year span, while Title VII claims
only increased by 4%.
5. 116 S. CL 1307 (1996).
6. See id. at 1308.
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address whether the McDonnell Douglas7 test is the appropriate test to apply in
age discrimination cases, nor whether the McDonnell Douglas test disallows a
prima facie case involving direct evidence and circumstantial evidence?
Part II of this Note details the factual and legal background and the narrow
issue of the O'Connor v. Consolidated' case. Part III discusses the law prior to
this decision, and Part IV discusses the Court's holding. Part V details the
author's analysis of the new interpretation of the fourth prong of the McDonnell
Douglas test by discussing the history and the application of the ADEA, the
different classifications courts give to discriminatory acts and how these classi-
fications will change the outcome of an age discrimination claim; and, whether
the Court's application of the McDonnell Douglas test and the fourth prong was
correct. In Part VI of this Note, the author will discuss the future implications
and impacts of the new interpretation of the fourth prong and questions left
unanswered by the Supreme Court's decision.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Facts
James O'Connor ("O'Connor") had been an employee of Consolidated
Coin Caterers Corporation ("Consolidated ") for twelve years,9 when at age 56
he was fired and replaced by a 40 year old man." Consolidated serviced vend-
ing machines and cafeterias in industrial plants, schools, health care facilities
and businesses." O'Connor was the general manager of Consolidated's north-
ern region until the corporation reorganized, demoting him to general manager
of the southern region. 2 Consolidated also restructured the southern region
making it smaller. 3 O'Connor's supervisor explained that the demotion result-
ed because O'Connor was slow in responding to problem accounts 4 and he
failed to respond in a timely manner to a food distribution problem.'" Several
months later, the corporation again restructured the regions, discharged
O'Connor and replaced him with Ted Finnell, age 40, a manager of a smaller
operation within Consolidated. 6
During O'Connor's employment there were several occasions when
O'Connor's supervisor made comments to him regarding his age. 7 This direct
7. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
8. See O'Connor, 116 S. Ct. at 1307.
9. See id. at 1309.
10. See id.
11. See O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 56 F.3d 542, 543 (4th Cir. 1995).
12. See id.
13. See id. at 544.
14. See id.
15. See id. at 545.
16. See id. at 544.
17. O'Connor and Williams were in a company conference room watching the U.S. Open Golf Tour-
nament, and O'Connor stated he didn't think he could walk and play eighteen holes of golf, five days in a
row. Williams told O'Connor that he was too old. See O'Connor, 56 F.3d at 549. A month later, Williams
[Vol. 33:643
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evidence of comments by the supervisor, in which there were witnesses, was
submitted by O'Connor at trial."
O'Connor brought suit against Consolidated claiming that they had violat-
ed the ADEA by discharging him because of his age and replacing him with
Finnell." The district court granted summary judgment to Consolidated be-
cause the court believed O'Connor had not made a prima facie case since the
replacement was 40 years old and in the same protected class as O'Connor.'
On appeal by O'Connor, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed for the
same reasons' The Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari to
O'Connor.
B. Issue
The only issue the Supreme Court reviewed was whether O'Connor must
show that he was replaced by someone outside the age group protected by the
ADEA to make a prima facie case.'
III. PRIOR LAW
In litigating Title VII claims, the Supreme Court fashioned a test which
evaluates a plaintiff's claim of employer discrimination.24 Because ADEA
claims are similar to Title VII claims, lower courts have applied this same test
to ADEA claims.
A. The McDonnell Douglas Case
In McDonnell Douglas, the Supreme Court established a test to evaluate
circumstantial evidence offered by a plaintiff to prove that an employer inten-
tionally discriminated in violation of Title VII? Percy Green, a black mechan-
ic for McDonnell Douglas, was laid off because of a reduction in the work
came into O'Connor's office and told him, "O'Connor, you are too damn old for this kind of work."
O'Connor shouted to the Human Relations Manager, who was in earshot, "Allison, did you hear that?"
Allison told Williams that he "shouldn't say things like that" Brief for Petitioner at 5, O'Connor v. Consoli-
dated Coin Caterers Corp., 116 S. Ct. 1307 (1996) (No. 95-354). A month after that and two days before
O'Connor was terminated, Williams, O'Connor and another company employee were in the car, when the
employee said he was about to tam 50, Williams said "[iut's about time we get some young blood in this
company." O'Connor v. Consolidated, 56 F.3d at 549.
18. In further support of O'Connor's direct evidence, he offered the testimony by Philip Dennis, a sales-
man for Consolidated. See O'Connor, 56 F.3d at 551 (4th Cir. 1995). A day after O'Connor was fired, Dennis
had asked Williams why O'Connor was fired. See id. Williams replied "that all of us were getting old, that
Jim [O'Connor] was getting old." See id.
19. See O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 829 F. Supp. 155 (W.D.N.C. 1993) (granting
summary judgment granted for Consolidated).
20. See id.
21. See O'Connor, 56 F.3d at 543 (4th Cir. 1995).
22. See O'Connor, 116 S. Ct. at 1309 (1996).
23. See id.
24. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (the McDonnell Douglas test used for
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force. Green was involved in the civil rights movement and protested that his
lay off was racially motivated.' Three weeks later, McDonnell Douglas adver-
tised for mechanics and Green re-applied.s His application was rejected be-
cause of his civil rights protest, and Green brought a formal complaint with the
EEOC that he had been racially discriminated against.29
The Supreme Court, in hearing McDonnell Douglas' petition for certiorari,
first created a three-step test to allocate the plaintiff's burden of production and
the defendant's burden of production of evidence as follows: 1) the employee
must first establish a prima facie case;3" 2) then the burden of production shifts
to the employer to rebut the discrimination evidence by offering a nondiscrimi-
natory reason for its actions; and 3) the burden shifts back to the employee to
produce evidence that the offered reason was untrue.3? ' The burden of proof
always remains with the plaintiff, it is only the burden of production that
shifts.
32
Because Green had no direct evidence of intentional racial discrimination,
the Supreme Court created a test to weigh the probative value of circumstantial
evidence that a plaintiff must produce to meet the prima facie burden:3 1)
plaintiff belongs to a racial minority; 2) plaintiff applied and was qualified for a
job for which the employer was seeking applicants; 3) despite plaintiff's qualifi-
cations plaintiff was rejected; and 4) after plaintiff's rejection, the position re-
mained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of
plaintiff's qualifications.34
26. See id. at 794.
27. See id. As part of this protest, Green and other members of the Congress on Racial Equality illegally
stalled their cars at the plant and blocked access to it. See id. at 794-95.
28. See McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 796-97.
The Commission made no finding on respondent's allegation of racial bias under [§] 703(a)(1), but it
did find reasonable cause to believe petitioner had violated [§] 704(a) by refusing to rehire respon-
dent because of his civil rights activity. After the Commission unsuccess-fully [sic] attempted to
conciliate the dispute it advised respondent in March 1968, of his right to institute a civil action in
federal court within 30 days.
Id. at 797.
29. See McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 797.
30. The term "prima facie" not only denotes "the establishment of a legally mandatory, rebuttable pre-
sumption, but also may be used by courts to describe the plaintiff's burden of producing enough evidence to
permit the trier of fact to infer the fact at issue." See 9 J. WIGMOn., EVIDENcE, § 2494 (3d ed. 1940) (quot-
ing Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252 n.7 (1980)). "McDonnell Douglas
should have made it apparent that in Title VII context we use 'prima facie case' in the former sense." Id.
The prima facie case described in McDonnell Douglas did not include proof that some person outside
the protected class was hired in complainant's place. Rather the prima facie case there described is
based on the notion that, by ruling out the more obvious job-related reasons for not hiring him, a
Title VII complainant can create an inference of some tainted reason, i.e., some discriminatory rea-
son, sufficient to require the employer to articulate a legitimate reason for the complainant's rejection.
Id.; see also Loeb v. Textron, 600 F.2d 1003, 1013 (1st Cir. 1979).
31. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.
32. See id. "The nature of the burden that shifts to the defendant should be understood in light of the
plaintiff's ultimate and intermediate burdens. The ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the de-
fendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff." Id. See also
Board of Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 25 n.2 & 29 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing). See generally 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2489 (3d ed. 1940) ("the burden of persuasion 'never
shifts"').
33. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 800.
34. See id. at 802.
[Vol. 33:643
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A prima facie case raises inferences of discrimination only because the acts
are presumed, when otherwise unexplained, because more likely than not they
are based on consideration of impermissible factors." This is largely presumed
because experience shows that more often than not, people do not act arbitrari-
ly, without underlying agendas, especially in the workforce.36 Once the plain-
tiff establishes the prima facie case, the burden of production then shifts to the
employer to produce evidence rebutting the prima facie presumption.37 The
employer must articulate, but does not have to prove, a legitimate, nondiscrimi-
natory reason for its actions.3" If the employer fails to meet this burden of pro-
duction, the presumption remains and the court will most likely enter summary
judgment or after trial, a directed verdict for the employee. 9 If the employer
does meet this burden by articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory explana-
tion for the action, then the burden of production shifts back and the plaintiff
must produce evidence that the employer's explanation was false."
Other Supreme Court decisions and lower court decisions refined the
McDonnell Douglas test for use in Title VII and ADEA claims.
B. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine
The Court expanded its reasoning of applying the McDonnell Douglas test
in Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine' Joyce Burdine was hired by
the Texas department as an accounting clerk, for which she had several years
experience.42 She sought a promotion for which she was denied and subse-
quently terminated.43 She brought a Title VII claim asserting that she was dis-
criminated against because of her gender." The Supreme Court applied the
McDonnell Douglas test and clarified the parties burdens of production and per-
suasion.45
First, the Court stated that limiting a defendant's evidentiary burden to
production did not hinder the plaintiff because the defendant's explanation must
be clear and reasonably specific.' Even though the defendant does not have
the burden of persuasion, the defendant does retain an "incentive to persuade
35. See Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978). See also Int'l Brotherhood of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 n.44 (1977).
36. See Furnco, 438 U.S. at 577.
37. See Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1980).
38. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
39. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254.
40. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; see also Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256; Saint Mary's Honor
Center v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2754 (1993). See, e.g., United States v. McMillon, 14 F.3d 948 (4th Cir.
1994); DeMarco v. Holy Cross High School, 4 F.3d 166 (2d Cir. 1993); Moham v. Steego Corp., 3 F.3d 873
(5th Cir. 1993).
41. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248.
42. See id. at 250.
43. See id. at 251.
44. See id.
45. See id. at 250.
46. See id. at 258. "This obligation arises both from the necessity of rebutting the inference of discrimi-
nation arising from the prinia facie case and from the requirement that the plaintiff be afforded 'a full and fair
opportunity' to demonstrate pretext." Id.
1997]
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the trier of fact that the employment decision was lawful."'47 Second, if the
plaintiff meets the four criterion established in the McDonnell Douglas case,
then the plaintiff is entitled to an inference of illegal employer discrimination,
despite the direct evidence reflecting intentional discrimination." The Court
reasoned that this inference would be given because the two most obvious rea-
sons for termination, lack of qualifications and lack of work, would be elim-
inated.49 Finally, the Court reaffirmed that they "remain confident that the
McDonnell Douglas framework permits ... plaintiff[s] meriting relief to dem-
onstrate intentional discrimination."'
The McDonnell Douglas framework (as used in ADEA discrimination
cases) has been applied differently in the lower and appellate courts. Generally,
the lower courts fashioned the prima facie criterion to be case specific, while
each circuit applied the fourth criteria differently to ADEA cases.
C. The Fourth and Sixth Circuits
The Fourth and Sixth Circuits interpret the fourth prong of the McDonnell
Douglas test to mean that if the replacement or retained worker was forty or
above, then they were also in the protected class, and only replacement by
workers or retained workers who were under forty would be evidence that is
relevant to establishing that prong."
The Fourth Circuit in Mitchell v. Data General Corp.52 applied the
McDonnell Douglas test in deciding a reduction-in-force case. Mitchell, a fifty-
eight year old manager, was terminated when the company was forced to re-
duce its workforce, based upon his poor performance evaluations. 3 Mitchell
brought an ADEA claim against the company. The Fourth Circuit interpreted
the fourth prong of the McDonnell Douglas test in the reduction-in-force case
as requiring Mitchell to show that the employees retained were under the age of
forty and that they were performing at a lower level than he was. 4
In Roush v. KFC National Management Co.,55 the Sixth Circuit applied
the McDonnell Douglas test in a discharge case. Betty Roush was sixty-one
years old when she was confronted with the choice between early retirement or
being discharged from her job 6 Roush brought a claim of age discrimination
47. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 258. A defendant normally attempts to prove the factual basis for its non-dis-
criminatory explanation. Already liberal discovery rles are supplemented by plaintiff having access to the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's investigatory files. See EEOC v. Associated Dry Goods Corp.,
449 U.S. 590 (1981).
48. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254.
49. See id. at 253-54.
50. Id. at 258.
51. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Data Gen. Corp., 12 F.3d 1310, 1314-15 (4th Cir. 1993); Roush v. KFC Nat'l
Mgmt. Co., 10 F.3d 392, 396 (6th Cir. 1993).
52. Mitchell, 12 F.3d at 1314-15.
53. See id.
54. See id. at 1316.
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against KFC5 The Sixth Circuit, in applying the McDonnell Douglas test,
required Roush to show that she had been replaced by an employee younger
than workers in the protected class as well as showing that she had been dis-
charged because of her age. 8
Other lower courts do not apply the fourth prong of the McDonnell Doug-
las test so fatally.
D. All Other Lower Circuit Courts
The other lower circuits, (except for the First Circuit), use the McDonnell
Douglas test as well, but require that the plaintiff prove the replacement was
younger. 9 The courts differ on how much younger the replacement must be.'
An example of this application can be found in Schwager v. Sun Oil Co.,6
where the Tenth Circuit interpreted the fourth prong to mean only that "the
position was filled by employees younger than the age of the plaintiff."62
Schwager, who had been a long-time employee of Sun, was discharged and
replaced with younger workers who were within the protected class. 3 The
Tenth Circuit held that Schwager met the fourth prong of the McDonnell Doug-
las test.
64
In deciding ADEA claims, the First Circuit, when it applied the McDonnell
Douglas test, did not require that the employee prove that the employee was
replaced by a younger employee or an employee outside the protected age
group.' The issue the First Circuit decided was whether or not the employee
was discharged because of the employee's age.' In Loeb v. Textron, Inc.,'
Loeb was fired at age fifty-four and was replaced by a thirty-four year old.
The First Circuit interpreted McDonnell Douglas as not requiring proof that the
replacement was outside the protected class, just that the employee had been
fired for discriminatory reasons.' The First Circuit, as well as later Supreme
57. See id.
58. See id. at 396.
59. See, e.g., Haskell v. Kaman Corp., 743 F.2d 113, 119 & 120 n.1 (2d Cir. 1984); Seman v. Coplay
Cement Co., 26 F.3d 428, 432 n.7 (3d Cir. 1994); Lindsey v. Prive Corp., 987 F.2d 324, 326, n.5 (5th Cir.
1993); Roper v. Peabody Coal Co., 47 F.3d 925, 926-27 (7th Cir. 1995); Rinehart v. Independence, 35 F.3d
1263, 1265 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1822 (1995); Douglas v. Anderson, 656 F.2d 528, 531-32
(9th Cir. 1981); Schwager v. Sun Oil Co., 591 F.2d 58, 60-61 (10th Cir. 1979); Goldstein v. Manhattan
Indus., Inc., 758 F.2d 1435, 1442 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1005 (1985); Cuddy v. Carmen,
694 F.2d 853, 856-57 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
60. See supra note 59.
61. 591 F.2d 58 (10th Cir. 1979).
62. Id. at 61 (footnote omitted). "In applying these standards, however, it is emphasized that they are
merely guidelines and not inflexible, rigid approaches to determine whether a Prima facie case has been estab-
lished." Id. at 61 n.l.
63. See Schwager, 591 F.2d at 59.
64. See id. at 61. Schwager established the prima facie case by showing that "sixty percent of his sales
territory was taken over by employees substantially younger than 45 years of age." Id.
65. See Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1013 (1st Cir. 1979).
66. See id. at 1017.
67. 600 F.2d 1003 (1st Cir. 1979).
68. See id. at 1008.
69. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 805-6.
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Court decisions, interpreted the fourth prong as not requiring proof that the
replacement was outside the protected class. 0
Based on the different interpretations by the lower circuit courts, it was
clear that there was no uniformity in the application of the fourth prong of the
McDonnell Douglas test.
IV. THE O'CONNOR V. CONSOLIDATED DECISION
In short, a seven paragraph opinion by Justice Scalia, the Court only dealt
with the fourth prong of the McDonnell Douglas test of whether the replace-
ment employee must be outside the protected class.7 In the unanimous deci-
sion, the Supreme Court held that because the ADEA prohibits discrimination
on the basis of age and not class membership, the correct application of the
fourth prong would require O'Connor to prove that the replacement was youn-
ger but not that the replacement was outside the protected class to establish a
prima facie case.'
Justice Scalia suggested in the decision that a prima facie case meant
"there must be at least a logical connection between each element of the prima
facie case and the illegal discrimination for which it establishes a 'legally man-
datory, rebuttable presumption."' If an employee is fired because of age, it is
irrelevant74 if the person who replaced the employee is within the same pro-
tected class.7' The fourth prong of the McDonnell Douglas test as it was being
applied by the Fourth Circuit "lack[ed] probative value."76 Instead, proving the
prima facie case requires "evidence adequate to create an inference that an
employment decision was based on a[n] [illegal] discriminatory criterion."
The age difference between the discharged employee and the replacement
employee cannot be insignificant.7 The Court gave an example of a forty year
old replaced by a thirty-nine year old79 which would have been discriminatory
replacement and would have met the fourth prong as it existed because the
thirty-nine year old was outside the protected class. The Court compared this
example to the fact that when a fifty-six year old was replaced by a forty year
old, that replacement would not have met the fourth prong."0 The Court, by
these examples, stressed how illogically courts had been applying the fourth
prong.
70. See also International Bhd. Of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 n.44 (1977); Furnco
Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 579 (1978).
71. See O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 116 S. Ct. 1307, 1310 (1996).
72. See id.
73. Id. (quoting Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254, n.7 (1981)).
74. See O'Connor, 116 S. Ct. at 1310.
75. See id.
76. Id.
77. Id. (quoting Int'l Bhd. Of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 (1977) (emphasis added)).
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The ADEA prohibits employers from discriminating because of age, not
because of class membership. In dicta, Justice Scalia suggested that the replace-
ment employee, rather than being outside the protected class, must be "substan-
tially" younger than the discharged employee. The Court did not give any
guidelines to follow in determining how much younger the replacement must be
to meet the fourth prong.'
The Supreme Court still did not decide if McDonnell Douglas was the
applicable test for age discrimination cases, but since O'Connor and Consolidat-
ed did not contest the application and because lower circuit courts have applied
some version of the McDonnell Douglas test,82 the Court proceeded as if it
was the applicable test." Unless the Supreme Court decides that McDonnell
Douglas is the appropriate test to apply, clarifying how to apply the fourth
prong could be immaterial since a different standard may be used.
V. ANALYSIS
In deciding O'Connor v. Consolidated, the Supreme Court clarified that
the fourth prong of the McDonnell Douglas test would be applied by looking at
the age of the replacement worker without requiring the replacement worker to
be outside the terminated employee's protected class. But the Court left unan-
swered questions in its decision. Some unanswered questions are: 1) must the
replacement worker be younger or substantially younger than the terminated
employee, 2) is proof of a replacement necessary in determining if a plaintiff
has a prima facie case, 3) is the McDonnell Douglas test appropriate for age
discrimination cases, and 4) does application of the McDonnell Douglas test
disallow a prima facie case involving direct evidence or circumstantial evi-
dence?
In understanding the seriousness of age discrimination and why the
McDonnell Douglas test is an appropriate test, it is important to know the histo-
ry behind the ADEA and how it arose out of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act."
A. History of the ADEA
"It is therefore the purpose of this [Act] to promote employment of older
persons based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimi-
nation in employment; to help employers and workers find ways of meeting
81. See id.
82. See id. at 1309.
83. See id.
84. The Secretary of Labor conducted a study of age discrimination. Title VII, § 715. The Secretary's
report in 1965 concluded that congressional action was required because of the serious nature and problem of
age discrimination in the workforce. The ADEA became effective June 12, 1968. SECRETARY OF LABOR,
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problems arising from the impact of age on employment."85
At the time of the adoption of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,
Congress was considering including age as a protected class along with race
and gender, but because age was unlike those other distinct characteristics,
Congress did not believe that age warranted the same protection from unjust
employment as did race and gender." Congress was still considering adding
age to the protected classes in the Civil Rights Act, so the Secretary of Labor
conducted a study on whether age should be considered as one of the protected
classes." Secretary Wirtz determined that Congress should act to protect older
workers but concluded that age, which sometimes does affect ability, should not
be treated the same as race or sex, which does not affect job performance.88
The Secretary stated that older workers differed from other Title VII minority
groups because "age is one minority group in which... all seek... eventual
membership." 9 Because everyone ages, Secretary Wirtz felt that older workers
were discriminated against, but not always because of employer animus. Rather,
notions of a progressive society and the nation's misconceived perceptions
regarding age led to such discrimination.'
The ADEA was originally drafted to protect workers, age forty to sixty-
five, and no higher because after age sixty-five, ability to work may be affect-
ed." Termination by the employer would be justified.' The Act underwent
several amendments raising the age limit, until finally in 1986, the Act was
amended with the age range beginning at age forty but having no upper lim-
i.93
it., -
The ADEA states that "[i]t shall be unlawful for an employer to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual's age."94 According to the legisla-
tive debates, Congress deliberately structured the ADEA to protect older mem-
bers of the protected class against younger members of the same class.' Con-
85. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1994).
86. SECRETARY OF LABOR, supra note 84.
87. See THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER: AGE DISCRIMINATION in EMPLOYMENT, 111 CONG. REC.
23,037 (1965).
88. See id.
89. Id. at 23, 38.
90. See id.
91. See Age Discrimination Employment Act, PuB. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967).
92. See id.
93. There is no upper limit for most employees. See Act OF OCTOBER 31, 1986, PUB. L. No. 99-592,
§ 2(c)(1), 100 Stat. 3342, 3344 (1986) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (1994).
94. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1)(1994).
95. Senator Javits stated:
Section 4 of the Bill specifically prohibits discrimination against any "individual" because of his age.
It does not say that the discrimination must be in favor of someone younger than age 40. In other
words, if two individuals ages 52 and 42 apply for the same job and the employer selected the man
age 42 ... because he is younger than the man age 52, then he will have violated the act.
113 CONG. REC. 31,255 (1967). Senator Yarborough, the floor manager of the bill, expressly agreed with this
analysis:
It is not the intent of the sponsors of this legislation ... to permit discrimination on account of age,
whether discrimination might be attempted between a man of 38 and one 52 years of age, or between
[Vol. 33:643
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gress chose age 40,' because that was the age when discrimination most often
began.' Nothing in the ADEA suggests that an employer may discriminate
against an older employee in favor of a younger one merely because the youn-
ger one is in the protected class. As in Maxfield v. Sinclair Int'l,98 the Third
Circuit noted, "[i]f no intra-age group protection were provided by the ADEA,
it would be of virtually no use to persons at the upper ages of the protected
class whose jobs require experience since even an employer with clear anti-age
animus would rarely replace them with someone under 40." A rule limiting
protection to those replaced by employees younger than forty "fails to take the
reality of the working place into account. Because of the value of experience,
sixty-year-olds are rarely replaced by those under forty. The replacement pro-
cess is more subtle but just as injurious to the worker who has been dis-
charged."'
''
Age discrimination in an employer's actions and decisions is broadly for-
bidden by the ADEA. The forbidden discriminatory actions include: discharg-
ing; decisions regarding compensation; terms, conditions, and privileges regard-
ing employment; job classifications; job referrals; and exclusion from union
membership.'0 ' Employers, labor organizations, and employment agencies
must abide by these requirements, provided these groups meet the qualifying
criteria under the Act. To qualify, the employer, labor organization, or employ-
ment agency must have at least twenty employees for twenty or more weeks of
the year."
Under both the ADEA and Title VII, an employee who claims their em-
ployer acted with intentional discrimination may present direct evidence or
circumstantial evidence of the employer's discriminatory motive to the fact
finder. 3 One major difference between Title VII litigation and ADEA litiga-
tion, is that the ADEA incorporated the Fair Labor Standards Act,' entitling
individuals to bring actions for legal relief as well as equitable relief. Ac-
one 42 and one 52 years of age. If two men applied for employment under the terms of this law, and
one was 42 and one was 52.... [the employer] could not tan either down on the basis of the age
factor.
Id.
96. "The prohibitions in this Chapter shall be limited to individuals who are at least 40 years of age." 29,
U.S.C. § 631(a) (1994).
97. Senator Javits stated "[t]hus, the committee, in my judgment, wisely decided to lower the age limit
only to 40, since that is the age where, according to information currently available, age discrimination gener-
ally seems to start." 113 CONG. REc. 31,255 (daily ed. 1967).
98. 766 F.2d 788 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied 474 U.S. 1057 (1986).
99. Id. at 792.
100. McCortsin v. United States Steel Corp., 621 F.2d 749, 754 (5th Cir. 1980). Although an employer
may rarely replace a sixty year old with a person younger than 40, "the sixty-year-old will be replaced by a
fifty-five-year-old, who, in turn, is succeeded by a person in the forties.... Eventually, a person outside the
protected class will be elevated but rarely to the position of the one fired." Id.
101. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)-(c) (1994).
102. See 29 U.S.C. §§623(a),(d),(e), and (g) (setting out the requirements for employers); 29 U.S.C.
§630(e) (1994) (setting out the requirements for labor organizations); 29 U.S.C. §§623(b),(d), and (e) (setting
out requirements for employment agencies).
103. See United States Postal Serv. Board of Governors v. Aikins, 460 U.S. 711, 714 n.3 (1983).
104. 29 U.S.C. §§ 211(b), 216-17 (1994).
105. In Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 585 (1978), the Court concluded that because the ADEA was to
1997]
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cordingly, an ADEA plaintiff can have a jury trial whereas a Title VII plaintiff
cannot. The Title IV plaintiff is only entitled to equitable relief."
In litigating ADEA claims, courts have applied the same methods of proof
as Title VII employment discrimination cases"° since the purpose and the lan-
guage of the Acts are similar."es "The mere fact that Congress chose to pass a
separate statute rather than amend Title VII does not imply that age discrimi-
nation was intended to be subject to different standards and methods of proof
than race or sex discrimination.'" In Cuddy v. Carmen,"' the D.C. Circuit,
stated that because ADEA elements were analogous to Title VII elements, the
McDonnell Douglas methods of proof were appropriate to apply. Cuddy worked
for the New England Telephone company for thirty-eight years, when at age
sixty-five he was forced to retire."' The court stated that in order for Cuddy
to meet his burden of proof in the absence of direct evidence, the McDonnell
Douglas method of allowing inferences based on circumstantial evidence must
be enforced according to the FLSA which allows jury trials, jury trial should be available to an ADEA plain-
tiff. Now the ADEA expressly provides for jury trials. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(c) (1994).
106. See id.
107. Compare the language of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1994):
(a) It shall be unlawful for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's age;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive or tend to
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status
as an employee, because of such individual's age.
with 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a) (1994):
(a) Employer practices
It shall be unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or other-
wise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.
108. See, e.g., Furneo Const. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978) ("The method suggested in
McDonnell Douglas ... is merely a sensible, orderly way to evaluate the evidence in light of experience as it
bears on the critical question of discrimination."). See also Loeb v. Textron Inc., 600 F.2d 1003 (1st Cir.
1979). The McDonnell Douglas test is used because:
[I]t addresses two problems that exist in most employment discrimination cases: (1) direct evidence
of discrimination is likely to be unavailable, and (2) the employer has the best access to the reasons
that prompted him to fire, reject, discipline or refuse to promote the complainant. To offset, to some
degree [these difficulties], McDonnell Douglas affirms the right of a complainant to make a prima
facie showing of discrimination by establishing that his rejection did not result from.., lack of
qualifications or absence of a job opening.
Id. at 1014. See also Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 765-66 (1979); Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 577.
109. Loeb, 600 F.2d at 1015.
The first of these, 29 U.S.C. [§] 623 (f) (3), protecting an employer's right to act for good cause,
expresses a principle equally applicable in Title VII cases a fact evidenced by the McDonnell Doug-
las case itself. The second provision, that older persons may be treated differently for reasons other
than age, 29 U.S.C. [§1 623 (f) (1), also does not repudiate the McDonnell Douglas approach. (Foot-
notes omitted).
Id. at 1015-16.
110. 694 F.2d at 853 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
111. See id. at 854.
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be used."2 Because the ADEA arose out of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act,"' it is appropriate to analogize previously litigated cases and methods of
proof from Title VII claims to ADEA claims.
B. Types of Discrimination
"Disparate treatment" and "disparate impact" are two types of discrimina-
tion that can arise in employment cases. The former occurs when an employer
treats some people less favorably because of their age, race, color, religion, sex
or national origin."4 The latter occurs when employment practices are neutral
on their face in their treatment of different groups, but are, in reality, more
harsh on protected groups than non-protected groups."5
ADEA claims are typically classified as "disparate treatment" cases. Such a
classification requires an ADEA plaintiff to prove that the employer intentional-
ly treated the plaintiff differently from other employees because of the
plaintiff's protected status." 6 Because it requires a plaintiff to prove the
employer's motive, which is very difficult to do, a narrow view of discrimina-
tion results."7 The Second and Eighth Circuits have allowed ADEA plaintiffs
to use "disparate impact" theory in proving discrimination, where they could
not prove discrimination under "disparate treatment.""8 "The development of
"disparate impact" as an alternative theory has relieved some of the inequities
resulting from the above difficulties by extending the definition of discrimina-
tion,""' 9 but "disparate treatment" claims can't succeed unless the employee's
protected trait actually played a role in that process and had a determinative
influence on the outcome.'2°
McDonnell Douglas eased the burden of proof for "disparate treatment"
cases by creating the four prong test. 2' Though O'Connor v. Consolidated is
a "disparate treatment" discrimination case, it is important to realize that dispa-
112. See id. at 857-60.
113. Supra, note 84.
114. See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
115. See id.
116. See Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied 451 U.S. 945 (1981).
117. See id. at 1032-33.
118. See id. at 1027; see also Leftwich v. Harris-Stowe State College, 702 F.2d 686 (8th Cir. 1983).
119. Maria Ziegler, Disparate Impact Analysis and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 68 MINN.
L. REV. 1038, 1041 n.15 (1984).
120. See Amicus Brief for Respondent (Jan. 1996) at 12, O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp.,
116 S. Ct. 1307 (1996) (No. 95-354) (quoting Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 113 S. Ct. 1701, 1706 (1983)).
121. See Ziegler, supra note 118, at 1041 n.15.
The basis of disparate treatment analysis is that everyone can and should be treated equally. This
approach, however, contains both mechanical and theoretical difficulties.... In order to prove dis-
crimination-that similarly situated people are treated differently-a plaintiff has to prove that the
employer intended to discriminate against the plaintiff or the plaintiff's minority group. Since it is
illegal to discriminate, and costly if one is caught, in only the most blatant of circumstances will the
plaintiff be able to gamer the requisite evidence. Even when there is evidence to garner, it is time
consuming and costly because of the extensive discovery usually needed to feret [sic] out the proof
of subjective intent. Equally important, discrimination is not always intentional at a conscious level.
Under such circumstances it is unfair and counterproductive to require proof of a motive that is un-
necessary for the action and the harm.
Id. See also McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
1997]
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rate impact in ADEA discrimination cases will help plaintiffs prevail where
otherwise they could not.
C. The Fourth Prong Applied
In O'Connor v. Consolidated, the Supreme Court held in an unanimous
decision, that an employer who replaces an older worker because of age with a
younger' worker in the same protected class, may violate the ADEA and the
fourth prong of the McDonnell Douglas test.' In the author's view, the test
should be applied by looking at the age of the discharged worker or prospective
applicant and not by requiring the replacement worker to be younger than the
terminated employee's protected class. The Supreme Court's rule of requiring a
replacement to be younger or substantially younger" is as illogical as the
Fourth Circuit's rule requiring a replacement to be from outside the protected
class as a necessary element of a prima facie case in all cases, rather than fo-
cusing on whether the employee was actually discriminated against because of
age. 4 Under the Fourth Circuit's rule, a forty year old plaintiff who was fired
and replaced by a thirty-nine year old could establish a prima facie case, but a
sixty year old replaced by a forty year old could not. It is not clear what would
be unacceptable by the Supreme Court after this decision, even where compara-
tive age evidence based on the difference in ages is minuscule in the first sce-
nario but very strong in the second scenario." Applying the fourth prong rig-
idly, in requiring a plaintiff to be replaced by someone outside the protected
group or that the worker just be younger, is contrary to the Supreme Court's
admonitions that the McDonnell Douglas framework should not be "rigid,
mechanized or ritualistic, ' ' " and that the burden of establishing a prima facie
case is not onerous." The Court emphasized that a prima facie case is neces-
sary to "progressively... sharpen the inquiry into ... the question of inten-
tional discrimination,"'" by elimination of nondiscriminatory reasons used
most often in terminating individuals in protected classes, which are either
absolute or relative to the lack of qualifications and the absence of the vacancy
in the job sought. 9
122. O'Connor, 116 S. Ct. at 1310.
123. "Adding a 'substantially younger' requirement, for an example, will make the presumption
underinclusive because not all cases of actual discrimination will involve a substantially younger replace-
ment.... It is underinclusive particularly for older claimants, who are less likely to be replaced by persons
under 40." Reply Brief at 5-6, O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 116 S. Ct. 1307 (1996) (No.
95-354).
124. See Amicus Brief for Petitioner at 10, O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 116 S. Ct.
1307 (1996) (No. 95-354).
125. See id.
126. Furnco Const. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978); Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v.
Burdine,.450 U.S. 248, 253 n.6 (1981).
127. See Amicus Brief for Petitioner at 10-12, O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 116 S. Ct.
1307 (1996) (No. 95-354).
128. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 986 (1988) (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at
255 n.8).
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Consolidated argued that the McDonnell Douglas test should be applied as
follows: 1) O'Connor was in the age group protected by the ADEA; 2)
O'Connor was discharged; 3) at the time of the discharge, O'Connor was not
performing his job at a level that met his employer's legitimate expectations;
and 4) following his discharge, O'Connor was not replaced by someone of
comparable qualifications outside his protected class. 3 '
In addition, Consolidated argued that the Fourth Circuit was correct in
applying the fourth prong as it did; that there was no discrimination because
O'Connor's replacement was not outside the protected class; and summary
judgment was correct because O'Connor did not meet his prima facie burden,
"which must throw off the necessary inference of illegal discrimination." ''
Consolidated continued to argue that because the ADEA forbade discrimination
based on an individual's age and the Act was limited to those who are at least
forty years old, the ADEA created a "protected class."'32
Senior Circuit Judge Butzner dissented in the Fourth Circuit's decision of
O'Connor, stating that the fourth prong the majority was applying was an incor-
rect interpretation of the McDonnell Douglas test for termination-replacement
cases. 3 "Such an absolute requirement, however, has no justification in law
or policy .... The Act contains no language permitting employers to favor a
younger employee over an older one on the basis of age simply because the
130. See Respondent's Brief at 6, O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 116 S. Ct. 1307 (1996)
(No. 950354).
Where a plaintiff does not rely on the age characteristic of a replacement, the alternative test would
require a plaintiff to demonstrate:
(1) the employee was protected by the ADEA;
(2) he was selected for discharge from a larger group of candidates;
(3) he was performing at a level substantially equivalent to the lowest level of those of the
group retained; and
(4) the process of selection produced a residual work force of persons in the groups contain-
ing some unprotected persons who were performing at a level lower than that at which he
was performing.
Id. at 6-7.
131. Id. at 20. "The fourth element required to establish a 'prima facie case' of discrimination was intend-
ed to demonstrate unequal treatment by the relatively objective evidence of replacement by a member of a
non-protected class." Id. at 20-21.
The inference of illegal discrimination is generated by the fact that a non-protected person is some-
how favored over a protected person. A sustainable inference cannot be similarly generated merely by
comparison of chronological ages. Numerous courts have applied this analysis in both Title VII and
ADEA contexts .... The Fourth Circuit merely applied this logic to the ADEA claim before it."
(Citations omitted.)
Id at 21. See also EEOC v. Western Elec. Co., 713 F.2d 1011, 1014-15 (4th Cir. 1983).
132. Respondent's Brief at 22-23, O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 116 S. Ct. 1307
(1996)(No. 95-354).
By focusing on the treatment of protected and unprotected persons when it evaluated the record evi-
dence, the Fourth Circuit followed the framework utilized by Congress in crafting the Act's prohibi-
tions. Congress recognized that a particular class of persons, those 40 and older, should be protected
from age discrimination. While the ADEA forbids discrimination based on an individual's age; the
Act's prohibitions are limited to individuals who are at least forty (40) years old. Thus, the Act cre-
ates a 'protected class.' (Footnotes and citations omitted).
Id. at 22-23. But the Respondent even realized this was in age discrimination disparate treatment cases, look-
ing at how the employer treats individuals who are not of the same protected class as the older individual of
the protected class. Id. at 23.
133. See O'Connor, 56 F. 3d at 550.
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younger employee is within the protected age group.' 34
The EEOC contended that comparative age evidence should only be a part
of plaintiff's overall burden of proving discriminatory intent and pretext but it
should not be a part of the prima facie case.' 35 Comparative age evidence is
easy to provide to a court when there is a replacement, but when one does not
exist, comparative age difference evidence should not be required.'36 And
since there is no clear standard regarding comparative age difference, it is not
fair that this evidence is necessary in some discrimination cases but not in other
discrimination cases to establish a prima facie case, since in some cases it is
sufficient to foreclose certain plaintiffs' cases. 37
O'Connor was replaced because of his age, and the fact that the replace-
ment was forty years old ("substantially younger") and in O'Connor's protected
class, or if the replacement was fifty years old ("younger"), is insignificant. The
Supreme Court should only focus on the plaintiff's age and not a replacement
or retained worker's age for uniform application of the fourth prong of the
McDonnell Douglas test.
VI. FUTURE IMPLICATIONS AND IMPACTS
The Court's decision in O'Connor v. Consolidated not only avoided any
definitive answers on an appropriate way to evaluate evidence in ADEA claims
but created more questions. A few questions are as follows: 1) must the replace-
ment worker be younger or substantially younger than the terminated employee;
2) is proof of a replacement necessary in determining if a plaintiff has a prima
facie case; 3) is the McDonnell Douglas test appropriate in age discrimination
cases; and 4) does application of the McDonnell Douglas test disallow a prima
facie case involving direct evidence or circumstantial evidence? The questions
will be discussed individually.
A. Substantially Younger v. Younger
In dicta, Justice Scalia discussed that a replacement "substantially" younger
than the plaintiff is a "far more reliable indicator of age discrimination."' 38
The decision does not analyze whether substantially younger or younger is the
appropriate standard or how to apply it. This creates great uncertainty in appli-
cation by lower courts and there will be no uniformity in future case decisions.
The McDonnell Douglas framework must be applied as intended, to allow
workers with meritorious age discrimination claims to get past the initial burden
134. Id. "The age of a replacement employee should be a relevant, but not dispositive, factor for a court
to consider when deciding whether the plaintiff has established a prima facie case under the McDonnell
Douglas framework." Id.




138. O'Connor, 116 S. Ct. at 1310.
[Vol. 33:643
16
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 33 [1997], Iss. 2, Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol33/iss2/7
CAN AN ADEA PLAINTIFF EVER WIN?
of proof and be allowed to present evidence that they were discharged, demoted
or denied employment because of their age, whether substantially younger or
just younger.'39 A "'[pirocrustean limitation' restricting the ability to establish
a prima facie case to situations in which the replacement is younger than 40
would preclude many older, more experienced employees with meritorious
claims from relying on the McDonnell Douglas framework, simply because
their replacement was age 40 or 41 (rather than 38 or 39), even though that fact
alone does not remove the inference of discrimination."'" Because the
McDonnell Douglas test is a question of law for a judge, the court would focus
on what "substantially younger" means and could determine that the plaintiff
has not met the burden of proof of discrimination before the case ever reaches a
jury.14' If the court focused on the plaintiff's age and not on a replacement
worker's age or retained worker's age, the plaintiff's age alone could be an
indicator of the employer's motive.
A recent ruling in Phuong v. National42 demonstrates how the Court's
holding in O'Connor v. Consolidated creates uncertainty and a lack of unifor-
mity in lower courts. The D.C. district court held that a 57 year old replaced by
a 42 year old was substantially younger and therefore, violated the ADEA, but
the court did not give any guidelines on how they reached that conclusion. 43
Compare Phuong with Farley v. Miller Fluid Power Corp.,' where the Mli-
nois District Court felt that a twenty-six year difference met the Supreme
Court's definition of younger. 45
The proper test should not be substantially younger or younger, instead
there should be no requirement of proof of replacement to meet the prima facie
burden.
B. Proof of Replacement should not be Required
The courts could avoid this uncertain test by doing away with the substan-
tially younger versus younger requirement altogether. The EEOC suggested in
139. See Amicus Brief for Petitioner at 20-21 (Dec. 1995), O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers
Corp., 116 S. CL 1307 (1996)(No. 95-354).
140. Id. (quoting McCortsin v. United States Steel Corp., 621 F.2d 749, 753 (5th Cir. 1980)). (There is
"no reason to engraft [an under-age-40] requirement on to the law.") (quoting Maxfield v. Sinclair Int'l, 766
F.2d 788, 792 (3d Cir. 1985)).
141. See Amicus Brief for Petitioner at 20-21, O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 116 S. Ct.
1307 (1996) (No. 95-354).
142. 927 F. Supp. 487 (D.D.C. 1996).
143. See id. at 491. Tran Anh Phuong was employed with the National Academy of Sciences (hereinafter
"NAS") for 18 years. Ms. Phuong had held her position as Executive Assistant at the Commission on Engi-
neering and Technical Systems for many years and received outstanding performance evaluations and com-
mendations over the years. Her supervisor claimed she was replaced because she was unable to perform cer-
tain computer tasks that she was expected to complete and that her writing was unsatisfactory, as well as
being responsible for the loss and misprocessing of certain documents. NAS contended that it made every
effort to find an alternative position for Ms. Phuong but she resigned because of a work-related back injury.
Ms. Phuong testified that she was removed from her job by NAS because of her age and that she was forced
to resign. See id. at 489.
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its amicus brief" that a plaintiff need not produce evidence regarding the
replacement's age at all."4 The EEOC said no evidence should be needed be-
cause in some cases,"4 evidence concerning a replacement is impossible to
prove because the company is in the process of hiring a replacement, or in a
reduction in force case, there is no replacement. 49 Because the EEOC is the
agency that handles age discrimination complaints," ° their deference should
be afforded greater weight.' The Court has repeatedly accepted the proposi-
tion that a prima facie case can exist without any regard to the identity of the
replacement employee.'
This acceptance of a prima facie case would be an appropriate standard
because in some cases where an employer seeks a replacement for a terminated
employee but does not find one, the terminated employee would still be able to
make a prima facie case. In this situation, a court could find that the plaintiff
satisfied the fourth prong by showing that the employer sought a replacement
who had qualifications similar to the plaintiff's qualifications, even though no
replacement was found."3
In termination cases, the inference is that the employer fired the plaintiff
despite plaintiff performing satisfactory work and that the employer continued
to need someone to perform plaintiff's job. Employers do not ordinarily termi-
nate workers who were performing satisfactorily. Thus, the employer must
explain the basis for its termination of the employee. This explanation would
meet Justice Scalia's test that "there must be at least a logical connection be-
146. See Amicus Brief for Petitioner at 14, O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 116 S. Ct.
1307 (1996)(No. 95-354).
147. See id. at *5.
148. See EEOC v. Western Elec. Co., 713 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir. 1983).
149. Petitioners Brief at 20-23, O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 116 S. Ct. 1307 (1996)
(No. 95-354).
150. "Consistent with the language and legislative history of the statute, EEOC regulations bar discrimina-
tion within the protected age group." Id. at 10.
The regulations state:
[i]t is unlawful ... for an employer to discriminate in hiring or in any other way by giving prefer-
ence because of age between individuals 40 and over. Thus, if two people apply for the same posi-
tion, and one is 42 and the other 52, the employer may not lawfully turn down either one on the
basis of age.
29 C.F.R. 1625.2 (a).
151. See Kralman v. Illinois Dept. of Veterans' Affairs, 23 F.3d 150, 155 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 359 (1994) (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 844 (1984)). The EEOC is to issue regulations "necessary or appropriate for carrying out [the Act]," as
well as creating "reasonable exemptions" from the Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 628.
152. In McDonnell Douglas,
the employer failed to hire a qualified black employee, and then continued to look for employees of
similar qualifications; the Court held that this was sufficient to make out the prima facie case. The
prima facie case there did not depend on the race of the employees actually hired. And more recently
in St. Mary's, the Court set forth a hypothetical in which a black employee was discharged from a
workforce whose minority fraction was far larger than the minority fraction of the population as a
whole, and the firing decision was made by a black supervisor to boot. The Court recognized that
these facts, which did not include any reference to the race of the employee who was hired instead of
the plaintiff, would make out a prima facie case.
Petitioner's Brief at 15-16, O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 116 S. Ct. 1307 (1996) (No. 95-
354). See also St. Mary's Honor Center, 113 S. Ct. at 2750-51 (1993).
153. See Amicus Brief for Petitioner at 20-23, O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 116 S. Ct.
1307 (1996) (No. 95-354).
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tween each element of the prima facie case and the illegal discrimination"' 54
and the rebuttable presumption. 55 In a termination case under this proposal,
ADEA plaintiffs should be able to make out prima facie cases by showing that
they were within the protected age group, that they were discharged from a
position that they were qualified for, and that the employer sought or obtained a
replacement worker with similar qualifications to the discharged worker."6
This showing would eliminate the two most common non-discriminatory rea-
sons employers give for a discharge: 1) lack of qualifications in the applicant
and 2) the lack of available work." An inference is then raised that there was
discrimination by the employer, even if the plaintiff does not identify the re-
placement worker's age, by presenting to the court evidence that the job qualifi-
cations were being met satisfactorily by the plaintiff.58 Such a showing shifts
the burden to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for the termination. 9 A similar approach has been applied in Title VII cas-
es. 160
The Supreme Court should avoid this uncertain test by doing away with
the substantially younger and younger requirement altogether and instead not
require an ADEA plaintiff to produce evidence regarding the replacement's age
at all because in some cases, evidence concerning a replacement is impossible
to prove because the company is in the process of hiring a replacement, or in a
reduction in force case, where there is no replacement.
C. Is McDonnell Douglas the appropriate test to apply in ADEA cases?
Is the McDonnell Douglas test the proper test to apply in ADEA cases?
Yes. The McDonnell Douglas test is the best test because the ADEA is based
on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act; because McDonnell Douglas establishes a
burden allocation of proof for plaintiff and defendant; because most lower
courts and litigants recognize it as an appropriate test to apply; and because it
allows a plaintiff to utilize circumstantial evidence when that may be the only
evidence a plaintiff can obtain. In McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff did not
have to identify the race or other traits of applicants; rather, the plaintiff only
had to prove that McDonnell Douglas continued to search for applicants with
qualifications similar to the plaintiff's.' The employer should have the bur-
den of proving lawful discharge because they have the records of the
employee's work history.' In McDonnell Douglas, the Court stated that "the
154. O'Connor, 116 S. Ct. at 1310; see also Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S.
248, 254 (1981).
155. See O'Connor, 116 S. Ct. at 1310.
156. See Amicus Brief for Petitioner at 8, O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 116 S. Ct. 1307
(1996) (No. 95-534).
157. See Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 n.44 (1977).
158. See id.
159. See id.
160. See id; see also Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
161. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
162. Judge Posner explained, in Riordan v. Kempers, 831 F.2d 690, 697-698 (7th Cir. 1987):
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facts necessarily will vary in Title VII cases, and the... prima facie proof
required from [a plaintiff] is not necessarily applicable in every respect to dif-
fering factual situations."163
The Fourth Circuit argued that the application of the McDonnell Douglas
test was appropriate for termination-replacement cases, but because Consolidat-
ed only had replaced two employees and since there was no dispute as to who
replaced O'Connor,"6 and the replacement was in the protected class,
O'Connor didn't meet the burden. Without the McDonnell Douglas test, it
would have been difficult to decide the case. 65
Consolidated argued that the McDonnell Douglas elements did not create
as strong an inference of discrimination based on age because the failure to fill
a vacancy with a qualified individual over age forty raises less suspicion than
the refusal to offer the job to a qualified individual who is a minority."6 In
contrast to most race or gender cases where the employment hirers tend to be
white males, those making the employment decisions in age cases tend to be
over age forty themselves and are likely to have close relationships with older
employers. Consolidated additionally argued that the Supreme Court's treat-
ment of age classifications under the equal protection clause of the 14th
Amendment, in refusing to treat age as a suspect class and not subjecting age
classifications to the stricter scrutiny accorded to classifications based on race
and sex, was also an indication that McDonnell Douglas was not the appropri-
ate test.
6
The Sixth Circuit had observed that the replacement of an older worker
with a younger one may not create the same inference of discrimination as does
the replacement of an African-American worker with a Caucasian worker be-
cause it is a part of the natural progression of life that when older workers
leave the work force, they will usually be replaced with younger workers. 69
All the problems notwithstanding, the McDonnell Douglas test is the best
test we have to apply to ADEA cases as of date. Again, because the language
and purpose of the ADEA track the language and purpose of Title VII, and
because the purpose of the McDonnell Douglas framework is to protect employ-
ees from discriminatory employer action, the Supreme Court will probably
continue to apply Title VII principles, via the McDonnell Douglas test, to
Because most employment decisions involve an element of discretion, alternative hypotheses (includ-
ing that of simple mistake) will always be possible and often plausible. Only the very best workers
are completely satisfactory, and they are not likely to be discriminated against-the cost of discrimi-
nation is too great. The law tries to protect the average worker and even below-average workers
against being treated more harshly than would be the case if they were of a different [protected
class], but it has difficulty achieving this goal because it is so easy to concoct a plausible reason for
not hiring, or firing, or failing to promote, or denying a pay raise to, a worker who is not superlative.
Id.
163. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 n.13.
164. See O'Connor, 56 F.3d at 550.
165. See id.
166. See Brief for Respondent at 9, O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Crop., 116 S. Ct. 1307
(1996) (No. 95-354).
167. See id. at31.
168. See id.
169. See Laugesen v. Anaconda, 510 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1975).
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ADEA cases.
D. Is Direct Evidence Ignored?
Another issue not raised in O'Connor v. Consolidated, that will surface in
other ADEA cases, is the courts pigeon-holing plaintiff's prima facie evidence
into categories, destroying the evidence's probative value.
In O'Connor v. Consolidated, O'Connor tried to make out a prima facie
case under McDonnell Douglas and he based his case on direct evidence of the
age-related comments made by his supervisor. 7 The Fourth Circuit rejected
the direct evidence because the remarks had nothing to do with the discharge
decision itself.17' This ruling may have been correct as it related to the prima
facie case, but the court unfairly treated the age-based comments as having no
probative value." Even if the remarks of age bias are too attenuated to con-
stitute direct proof of discrimination, the remarks should be relevant as part of a
circumstantial case." The Fourth Circuit ignored this as circumstantial evi-
dence as well, when it focused solely on O'Connor's inability to satisfy the
fourth prong. This approach was too formalistic. In McDonnell Douglas, the
Supreme Court itself cautioned against applying the circumstantial evidence
framework in a "rigid, mechanized or ritualistic" fashion.75 By pigeon-holing
part of O'Connor's evidence as relevant only to his direct evidence case, and by
viewing the McDonnell Douglas framework only in literal terms of the four
elements, the Fourth Circuit failed to consider the probative power of all of
O'Connor's evidence.'76 Unfortunately, other courts compartmentalize direct
and circumstantial evidence in this same mechanical way."
On remand, the Fourth Circuit again granted Consolidated summary judg-
ment. The court did not consider the direct evidence and did not believe
O'Connor met the prima facie case by proving that his age was the true reason
for his discharge and not because of poor performance. 7 '
An ADEA plaintiff's prima facie direct and circumstantial evidence should
not be pigeon-holed into categories destroying its probative value. Instead, if
there is direct evidence, the plaintiff should be allowed to use it for its own
worth and not forced into fitting it into the McDonnell Douglas test.
170. See supra note 17.
171. See O'Connor, 56 F.3d at 550.
172. See Amicus Brief for Respondent at 10, O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 116 S. Ct.
1307 (1996) (No. 95-0354).
173. See id.
174. See O'Connor, 56 F.3d at 547-48.
175. See Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978); Texas Dep't of Community Affairs
v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 n.6 (1981).
176. See Amicus Brief for Respondent at 10-11, O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 116 S.
Ct. 1307 (1996) (No. 95-354).
177. See Trans-World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985).
178. The Fourth Circuit still did not believe O'Connor met his burden of proof under the McDonnell
Douglas test by proving that the plaintiff's age was the true reason for the discharge and that its decision was
pretextual. O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 84 F.3d 718 (1996) (Butzner, Senior Circuit Judge,
dissenting for the same reasons in O'Connor 1).
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VII. CONCLUSION
In O'Connor v. Consolidated, the Supreme Court held that an employer
who replaced a worker because of age with a younger worker in the same pro-
tected class violates the fourth prong of the McDonnell Douglas test. This sim-
ple holding's unanswered questions should be answered as follows: the younger
versus substantially younger test can be avoided by not requiring proof of a
replacement in determining if plaintiff has a prima facie case. Courts should not
look at a replacement workers being younger or substantially younger than the
terminated employee, or prospective applicant, because proof of a replacement
should not be necessary in determining if plaintiff has a prima facie case when
in some cases there is no replacement. McDonnell Douglas is the appropriate
test to apply in age discrimination cases, with the change of only focusing on
the age of the plaintiff. Direct evidence should not be pigeon-holed into the
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